

“Tracking support to Sustainable Development Goals – the case of peace and security”

A submission from civil society organisations working on peace and sustainable development

March 2019

Overview

This submission provides a perspective from organisations with expert knowledge on peace and sustainable development in support of the process for defining the boundaries of the new statistical measure ‘Total Official Support for Sustainable Development’ (TOSSD). Following an expert meeting on this topic (OECD, Paris, 5 February 2019), it explores the question of whether – and under what circumstances – peacekeeping, disarmament, criminal justice and other military-security assistance should be considered as part of financing for sustainable development. It provides a number of discussion points, together with supporting evidence and recommendations (in bold and numbered). This submission builds on recommendations by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) civil society organisation (CSO) reference group and other CSOs to: encourage the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its members to reinforce the coherence and conflict sensitivity of development assistance for sustainable development; support the empowerment of local civil society and the impartiality of humanitarian action; and ensure that all resources included in TOSSD have a demonstrably positive sustainable development impact.¹ We urge the OECD and participating governments and agencies to take it fully into account when defining and participating in TOSSD.

- 1. We strongly urge the OECD and participating governments to take a cautious approach to including military-security assistance as part of TOSSD. It should rule out the inclusion of such assistance where there is a credible risk of negative impacts, taking account of the examples and recommendations provided in this document.**
- 2. Although governments may find it necessary to support UN and other regional peacekeeping operations to maintain international, regional and national security interests, the role of many such military operations in fighting wars and extending the authority of state actors implicated in grave human rights abuses precludes support for them from being considered as a contribution to peaceful, just and inclusive societies and sustainable development.**
- 3. Not only should support for the use of force by such operations be excluded from TOSSD, but the logistical, training, infrastructure and intelligence assistance provided by UN and other regional peacekeeping operations to other military-security actors and operations should also be excluded. In many contexts this assistance contributes to war efforts that too often escalate conflict rather than contributing to the search for a political resolution of conflict and addressing human security and development needs.**
- 4. Support for non-military components of peace operations – including mediation, human rights monitoring, other civilian units, and programmes to consult with communities and address their security and accountability concerns – could be considered as part of TOSSD, depending on the satisfactory examination of further evidence and examples, provided that these components do not involve use of force or provide ‘train-and-equip’ or other material or financial assistance to those responsible for human rights violations.**

5. TOSSD could legitimately include support for collection, registration, marking, safe storage and destruction of weapons and ammunition, including supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Arms Trade Treaty or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. TOSSD could also include related efforts to demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants into society (provided they are human rights compliant).
6. Given the prevalence of repressive approaches to counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics, support to governments and other security actors for ‘combatting’ (or ‘countering’) terrorism and other violent or organised crime through military-security, intelligence and criminal-justice mechanisms should not be considered part of TOSSD.
7. Given the importance of human rights-compliant criminal justice and dispute resolution capacities for reducing violence, strengthening access to justice and achieving peace and sustainable development, TOSSD could include support for: non-coercive policing capacities, including capacities to investigate and prosecute crime (excluding intelligence and surveillance capacities) and support for community-based policing skills and infrastructure; prison infrastructure and offender rehabilitation; extending access to justice and legal assistance and building judiciary, mediation and dispute resolution capacities; assistance to community and civil society demand for, engagement in and oversight of security and justice sector reforms; and efforts to help promote economic alternatives to organised crime. However, even in such cases, support to governments should only be eligible for TOSSD in the case of countries making progress on violence reduction, fundamental freedoms, access to justice, anti-corruption and human rights compliance under SDG16+ targets and other relevant measures.
8. Because of the risks they pose of exacerbating conflict and undermining progress in addressing conflict drivers prioritised under the SDG16+ agenda, military interventions and defence support programmes should not be included in TOSSD under any circumstances, except in the specific instances noted in our earlier recommendations.



A Significant concerns warrant a cautious approach

The inclusion of SDG16 on peaceful, just, inclusive societies in the 2030 Agenda was very hard to negotiate, in large part because of the fears that its inclusion would serve to ‘securitise’ a multilateral development agenda that needed to champion equality, sustainability and social justice. We are deeply concerned that accrediting military-security spending as a contribution to the SDGs could fulfil the worst fears of those who cautioned against integrating peace, justice and inclusion into the framework. Accrediting actions that often undermine peace and development as ‘progressive’ contributions could thus undermine the legitimacy of the 2030 agenda – and the trust of civil society and many member states. It could ultimately lead to peace, justice, inclusion and governance issues being excluded from future global development frameworks and to the neglect of the vital strategic and operational link between peace and development.

The 2030 Agenda commitments to promote peaceful, just, inclusive societies were intended to encourage preventative and developmental investments to address conflict and promote peace. Development and peacebuilding are already orphans when compared with vast military and peacekeeping expenditures. In 2017, world military spending was more than 11 times greater than Official Development Assistance (ODA).² According to the World Bank-United Nations ‘Pathways for Peace’ report, ‘most bilateral financing for military and police [...] has gone to enhancing operational capacities rather than to transformative reforms conducive to preventing conflict and building peace.’³ For example, available figures suggest that over the past decade the US spent roughly three times more on military assistance to the Middle East than all donors spent on peace-related activities for the entire world.⁴ Including risky military-security investments within TOSSD would establish incentives in the wrong direction.

At the meeting on 5 February 2019, several examples of military-security initiatives that participating governments and agencies advocated for including in TOSSD raised alarm bells. Such efforts have in the past proven highly detrimental to peace, justice, inclusion, transparency and sustainable development, and risk doing so in future. There are significant risks that TOSSD will give governments credit for contributions under target 16.a⁵ despite these contributions undermining progress under targets 16.1, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.7 or 16.10 (on reducing violence, improving access to justice, participatory decision-making, anti-corruption, arms proliferation and fundamental freedoms).⁶ The latter targets are vital for peace and development progress.

Ultimately, agreeing overly broad definitions in this area could have the impact of rebranding war-fighting as peacebuilding, but the two are not the same: the former is the antithesis of sustainable development, and it is the latter which is being badly neglected by governments today. Addressing the underlying causes of conflict and insecurity is better done through long-term, upstream investments and early action to address marginalisation, promote inclusion, and support economic and human development – not through investments in war and conflict.

There is little evidence that building military capabilities leads to improved peace, justice and development outcomes. But there is much evidence regarding the negative impacts of military-security assistance. Governments often feel compelled to pursue military-security initiatives to advance national security interests, but these interests are not necessarily the same as the human security interests of people in developing and developed countries. Past experience also suggests that problematic security assistance partnerships have been maintained – in spite of harmful

impacts on peace and development – because of national security interests in the developed world (such as selling arms, cutting immigration and countering terrorism). For this and other reasons, ODA figures exclude assistance provided in donors’ national security interests.⁷

Putting an AK-47 in the wrong hands does much more damage than allowing the diversion of a sack of rice. Whereas all forms of development action and assistance carry ‘do no harm’ risks, the risks of military-security equipment, skills and infrastructure contributing to harmful outcomes is considerably greater than with most other forms of assistance – both in terms of its likelihood and its impact.

Although there are doubtless some examples of military-security assistance contributing in a conflict-sensitive way to peace and sustainable development, it was made clear at the 5 February meeting that the TOSSD Task Force Secretariat would not be able to verify the achievement of positive impacts in relation to specific actions and operations. In this context, it will be essential to establish rules that prevent governments from getting credit under TOSSD for activities that are highly likely to put peace and development at risk – and only to include actions with a high potential to have positive impacts that carry very low risks.

Increasing the transparency of military-security assistance is a worthy goal. This could help improve the accountability and impacts of such activities. However, classifying such assistance as a contribution to peace and development is not an appropriate way to achieve such transparency for all the reasons articulated in this submission.

- 1. We strongly urge the OECD and participating governments to take a cautious approach to including military-security assistance as part of TOSSD. They should rule out the inclusion of such assistance where there is a credible risk of negative impacts, taking account of the examples and recommendations provided in this document. They should also ensure TOSSD datasets can be disaggregated to ensure transparency regarding which SDG targets assistance contributes towards.**

B Peacekeeping and military stabilisation operations

The meeting included discussion of whether financial support for United Nations Security Council mandated peace operations such as the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and for regional military operations such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) or the G5 Sahel joint force could be considered part of TOSSD.

Any decision on this should take account of the fact that UN-supported peace operations increasingly have mandates and operations focused on narrow understandings of stabilisation and counter-terror objectives. They are thus increasingly required to: combat, deter and protect territory from ‘aggressors’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘violent extremists’; offer operational support to other international counter-terror missions; provide intelligence and ‘targeting packs’ to military actors; side with states to protect, reinforce and expand their authority; train and equip security forces; define rebel groups as ‘violent extremists’ and support or undertake countering/preventing violent extremism (C/PVE) initiatives, including narrative campaigns against certain groups; and avoid dialogue and mediation efforts with armed groups labelled as ‘terrorists’.⁸

Thus some international and regional ‘peace’ operations are, directly or indirectly, engaged in ongoing war efforts, with the risk of contributing to the escalation of violence rather than supporting peace and sustainable development. In the case of MINUSMA, the UN mission is supporting a government whose forces were implicated in major human rights violations on at least three

occasions in 2018.⁹ As the UN Secretary General told the Security Council in 2018: “The proximity of MINUSMA, and its support role and cooperation with security actors, including counter-terrorism actors, had contributed to the perception that the mission was engaging in counter-terrorism actions”.¹⁰ For John Karlsrud, this is more than a perception: “The mission is actively supporting counter-terrorism actions, as it has been preparing ‘targeting packs’ and has been informally sharing information with the French parallel counter-terrorism operation Barkhane”.¹¹

As peacekeeping expert Cedric de Coning has observed, a new generation of stabilisation missions has emerged in which ‘the UN Security Council has identified aggressors that need to be contained’.¹² Such missions introduce an element of offensive operations, and ‘create a structural relationship between the host government [...] and the UN that leaves little room for engagement with non-state actors’ and that undermines the host government’s willingness ‘to seek political settlements or to invest in the state services’.¹³

Beyond UN peace operations, operations such as the G5 Sahel and AMISOM have an explicitly belligerent role and approach, which cannot be considered a direct contribution to peace and sustainable development. Regarding support for the G5 Sahel, International Crisis Group has highlighted the risks of ‘pushing more people into the arms of armed groups through frequent misconduct and abuse against civilians during counterinsurgency operations’ and ‘fuel[ing] the corruption that has undermined the G5 member countries in the past’.¹⁴

In the case of AMISOM, human rights reporting from 2009 to 2017 consistently documents the role of AMISOM, regional forces and their proxies in indiscriminate attacks and serious abuses against Somali civilians.¹⁵

Of course, some peace operations do to varying degrees have a positive impact on peace and development, or may be seen as necessary primarily for non-development reasons. At times, peacekeeping operations in Central African Republic or Democratic Republic of the Congo have played an important role in terms of preserving space for civil society to operate. However, as noted, a cautious approach is warranted by the fact that the TOSSD Secretariat would not be able to analyse the specific impacts of different operations and exclude operations that undermine peace and development.

- 2. Although governments may find it necessary to support UN and other regional peacekeeping operations to maintain international, regional and national security interests, the role of many such military operations in fighting wars and extending the authority of state actors implicated in grave human rights abuses precludes support for them from being considered as a contribution to peaceful, just and inclusive societies and sustainable development.**
- 3. Not only should support for the use of force by such operations be excluded from TOSSD, but the logistical, training, infrastructure and intelligence assistance provided by UN and other regional peacekeeping operations to other military-security actors and operations should also be excluded. In many contexts this assistance contributes to war efforts that too often escalate conflict rather than contributing to the search for a political resolution of conflict and addressing human security and development needs.**
- 4. Support for non-military components of peace operations – including mediation, human rights monitoring, other civilian units, and programmes to consult with communities and address their security and accountability concerns – could be considered as part of TOSSD, depending on the satisfactory examination of further evidence and examples, provided that these components do not involve use of force or provide ‘train-and-equip’ or other material or financial assistance to those responsible for human rights violations.**

C Disarmament

Collection, registration, marking, safe storage and destruction of weapons and ammunition all contribute to reducing the proliferation of arms in line with target 16.4. We have identified no significant risks of assistance for such purposes undermining peace or sustainable development. Most of these activities would already qualify as ODA.¹⁶ Disarmament-related activities that could fit under TOSSD that do not currently count as ODA include activities supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, contributions to the Arms Trade Treaty or contributions to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Such activities would contribute to target 16.4, conflict prevention and protection of civilians without having negative impacts on other aspects of sustainable development.

- 5. TOSSD could legitimately include support for collection, registration, marking, safe storage and destruction of weapons and ammunition, including supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Arms Trade Treaty or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. TOSSD could also include related efforts to demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants into society (provided they are human rights compliant).**

D Police, combatting transnational crimes and terrorism

The ability to administer criminal justice in a human rights compliant ways is an important foundation for peace and sustainable development. Benign capacities in this area can contribute significantly to progress under targets 16.1, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.9 and 16.10. Insufficient policing, investigatory, prosecutorial, legal assistance, prison and courts capacities can drastically undermine adherence to human rights norms in contexts of insecurity, creating an enabling environment for abusive security responses that can fuel violence and conflict. Therefore, efforts to strengthen human security, to promote community and civil society demand for and engagement in security and justice sector reforms, to extend access to justice and legal assistance and to support civilian oversight of military and criminal justice institutions can all contribute positively to peace and development. For example, criminal justice programmes which support civil society-led prison re-entry programmes for people convicted of terrorism offences, or local civil society groups' efforts to draft white papers on police reform, can contribute to sustainable development.

At the same time, many counter-terror and security sector reform initiatives are not conflict sensitive and undermine peace and development, and assistance to criminal justice capacities can carry risks. In many contexts, the criminal justice system is the primary tool of state coercion and repression – problems that undermine any hope of progress towards peace and sustainable development, and perpetuate such practices as indiscriminate violence, extrajudicial killings, torture, unfair trials and arbitrary detention. Even well-intentioned support can reinforce such tools and the power of those who wield them. Counter-terror assistance in such contexts has generally contradicted the need to make the security sector less abusive and more accountable.¹⁷

Donors would not be well advised to claim credit under TOSSD definitions for supporting the construction of prisons that are subsequently used to torture political prisoners. In a world in which 'nearly six in ten countries are seriously restricting people's fundamental freedoms',¹⁸ and in which the UN Secretary General has noted that '93% of all terrorist acts between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries with high levels of extra-judicial deaths, torture and imprisonment without trial',¹⁹ such scenarios are far from improbable, and must be avoided.

In many contexts, assistance for security sector reform has been profoundly subverted by ulterior political and security motives on the part of donors and recipients.²⁰ Given the paramilitary character of many police forces and units as well as the abusive role of semi-official security

structures in many countries, non-military security assistance does not necessarily carry a lesser risk than military support. The risks of the diversion and misuse of policing assistance can be significant. According to the UN Security Council's former coordinator for the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), Matt Bryden:

'Between 1993 and 1995, the United Nations Mission in Somalia undertook a massive effort to rebuild the Somali police force and judicial system. In addition to training and salaries, the United Nations provided thousands of weapons and hundreds of pick-up trucks and high-frequency radios. But when the mission was withdrawn in 1995, the entire establishment collapsed, with most of the equipment ending up in the hands of local militias. The next serious effort to rebuild Somali security forces followed the establishment of the transitional federal government (TFG) in 2004. Once again the United Nations took the lead in reviving the Somali police force, but the program was soon mired in controversy as police units trained and paid by the United Nations acquired a paramilitary character, engaging in counterinsurgency operations and – like the armed forces – perpetrating abuses against civilians.'²¹

There are similar concerns about assistance to border security forces, coastguards and related militias in a number of African contexts, with many examples attesting to the violence and human rights violations occurring in the context of the European drive to stem 'irregular' migration.²²

Such examples – which are by no means exceptional – illustrate the huge risks that donors could claim credit for supporting peace and sustainable development by delivering criminal justice assistance – via international organisations or bilaterally – when in reality this assistance is enabling abuse or even equipping militants.

- 6. Given the prevalence of repressive approaches to counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics, support to governments and other security actors for 'combatting' (or 'countering') terrorism and other violent or organised crime through military-security, intelligence and criminal-justice mechanisms should not be considered part of TOSSD.**
- 7. Given the importance of human rights-compliant criminal justice and dispute resolution capacities for reducing violence, strengthening access to justice and achieving peace and sustainable development, TOSSD could include support for: non-coercive policing capacities, including capacities to investigate and prosecute crime (excluding intelligence and surveillance capacities) and support for community-based policing skills and infrastructure; prison infrastructure and offender rehabilitation; extending access to justice and legal assistance and building judiciary, mediation and dispute resolution capacities; assistance to community and civil society demand for, engagement in and oversight of security and justice sector reforms; and efforts to help promote economic alternatives to organised crime. However, even in such cases, support to governments should only be eligible for TOSSD in the case of countries making progress on violence reduction, fundamental freedoms, access to justice, anti-corruption and human rights compliance under SDG16+ targets and other relevant measures.**

E Engagement with partner country militaries

The meeting on 5 February raised the question of whether to include financing partner countries' military spending, capacity building of partner countries' armed forces (such as the European Union Training Mission in Mali or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) trust funds to support defence capacity building), and provider countries' military interventions (such as Operation Barkhane).

Operation Barkhane is a military counter-insurgency operation that also reinforces the capacities of G5 Sahel regional armed forces to combat designated terror groups. As noted, the abuses committed in the context of these operations should rule out any prospect of classifying them as a contribution to peace and sustainable development as part of TOSSD. Such military assistance in many contexts has fed into violence and instability rather than contributing to peace.

Yemen provides a cogent example. As early as 2002, there was advance warning that military aid to Yemen for fighting terrorism would be misused by the regime.²³ Nonetheless, over the next decade, the US supported Yemen to develop counter-terror forces, which were not primarily used to tackle terrorism, but rather to protect the capital and the presidential palace.²⁴ During the 2011 uprising, the Yemeni regime used counter-terror capacities to suppress protests, committing serious human rights violations.²⁵ On the rare occasions when it conducted counter-terror operations targeting al-Qaeda, the regime ended up targeting tribes and the wider population.²⁶

As in many other contexts, much military assistance to Yemen ultimately ended up in the hands of militants.²⁷ Much of the weaponry used by ISIS was supplied by Russia, China and Warsaw pact countries to the Syrian and Iraqi armies – but some was also originally provided by NATO countries to the Iraqi army.²⁸ A ‘disastrous’ train-and-equip programme in Syria has resulted in US-supplied weapons being diverted for sale by jihadist groups.²⁹ German arms shipments to Iraq in support of the Kurdish Peshmerga were suspended in January 2016 after some of the weapons were found on the black market.³⁰ As Amnesty International has noted, ‘Poor regulation and lack of oversight of the immense arms flows into Iraq going back decades have given IS [Islamic State] and other armed groups a bonanza of unprecedented access to firepower’.³¹ There are also many examples that illustrate how defence assistance – rather than contributing to peace – can escalate tensions and incentivise countervailing assistance to rival powers.³²

In the case of Afghanistan, the massive volumes of security assistance provided after the ouster of the Taliban were not perceived to benefit ordinary Afghans, but rather unaccountable elites.³³ As abusive and unaccountable warlords and militias were supported to attain military aims and provide security for international activities, Afghans came to see international interveners as complicit in abuses and crimes perpetrated by their ‘allies’.³⁴ Likewise, the Petraeus report of 2011 estimated that about \$360 million of US assistance had ended up in the hands of the Taliban and criminals, or political elites with ties to them.³⁵

The risks of perverse impacts of military assistance in fuelling corruption, repression and violence are significant. They cannot be dismissed as isolated examples in a wider context of generally positive practice, as was argued in the 5 February meeting. The track record of US security assistance has been well researched and provides an instructive example. Extensive US security assistance to Latin American countries has been associated with highly abusive security forces,³⁶ and one study affirms a relationship between US military assistance and the intensification of violence in Colombia.³⁷ US military training of foreign officers appears dramatically to increase the chance of a military-backed coup attempt.³⁸ US military assistance is positively related to local levels of repression and anti-American terrorism.³⁹ Strengthening military capacity tends to provoke, rather than subdue, terrorist attacks.⁴⁰ And provision of US military assistance may be associated with increased state repression and civil war.⁴¹

8. Because of the risks they pose of exacerbating conflict and undermining progress in addressing conflict drivers prioritised under the SDG16+ agenda, military interventions and defence support programmes should not be included in TOSSD under any circumstances, except in the specific instances noted in our earlier recommendations.

List of endorsing organisations and networks:

1. **Action Aid**
2. **Campaign Against Arms Trade**
3. **Care international**
4. **Christian Aid**
5. **Cordaid**
6. **Conciliation Resources**
7. **Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding**
8. **CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness**
9. **Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict**
10. **The Global Peacebuilding Coalition**
11. **International Alert**
12. **Namati**
13. **Open Society European Policy Institute**
14. **Oxfam International**
15. **Pax**
16. **PeaceNexus**
17. **Quaker Council on European Affairs**
18. **Rethinking Security**
19. **Saferworld**
20. **Search For Common Ground**
21. **Transparency and Accountability Partnership**
22. **Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom**

¹ See CSPPS, One, Save the Children, Oxfam, Care, Cordaid, ‘Promoting Coherence Across the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus’, statement prepared for the OECD DAC Senior Level Meeting, February 2019.

² See: SIPRI, ‘Global military spending remains high at \$1.7 trillion’, 2 May 2018, <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-military-spending-remains-high-17-trillion>; OECD, ‘Development aid stable in 2017 with more sent to poorest countries’, <http://www.oecd.org/development/development-aid-stable-in-2017-with-more-sent-to-poorest-countries.htm>.

³ See: United Nations, World Bank (2018), ‘[Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict](#)’, p. 232.

⁴ In the United States, for instance, military assistance to just the Middle East over the past decade was \$48.7 billion. To put this in perspective, global ODA to the Middle East over the same period was \$77 billion, and global ODA related to conflict, peace and security (CRS code 152) averages 1 percent of ODA for all fragile settings. Calculations by Hyslop, D, citing: Miller A, Sokolsky R, ‘What Has \$49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much’, Carnegie Endowment, 27 Feb 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/27/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much-pub-75657>; and data available via the OECD’s creditor reporting system. <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

⁵ ‘Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.’

⁶ 16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere; 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all; 16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime; 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms; 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.

⁷ OECD DAC, ‘CONVERGED STATISTICAL REPORTING DIRECTIVES FOR THE CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM (CRS) AND THE ANNUAL DAC QUESTIONNAIRE’, (8 April 2016), p 25: ‘Development co-operation should not be used as a vehicle to promote the provider’s security interests.’

⁸ Attree L, Street J, Venchiarutti L, ‘UN peace operations in complex environments: charting the right course’, 9Saferworld, (2018), p ii.

⁹ The Guardian (2018), ‘Mali mass grave victims had been in military custody, claims Amnesty’, April 03 (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/03/mali-mass-grave-victims-had-been-in-military-custody-claims-amnesty>); Reuters (2018), ‘U.N. says Malian forces executed 12 civilians at a market’, June 26 (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malisedsecurity-un/u-n-says-malian-forces-executed-12-civilians-at-a-market-idUSKBN1JM2JZ>); Lebovich A (2018), ‘Mali’s impunity problem and growing security crisis’, European Council on Foreign Relations, June (https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_malis_impunity_problem_security_crisis).

¹⁰ United Nations Security Council (2018), ‘Security Council, Report of the Secretary General “Situation in Mali”, S/2018/541’, 6 June.

¹¹ Karlsrud J (2017), ‘Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?’, Third World Quarterly, 38:6, January, pp 1215–1231.

¹² De Coning C (2018), 'Is stabilization the new normal? Implications of stabilization mandates for the use of force in UN peace operations', in Nadin P (ed), *Use of force in UN Peacekeeping*, Routledge, pp. 84–99.

¹³ De Coning C (2018), 'Is stabilization the new normal? Implications of stabilization mandates for the use of force in UN peace operations', in Nadin P (ed), *Use of force in UN Peacekeeping*, Routledge, pp. 84–99.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group (2017), 'Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force', *Africa Report* N. 258, December

¹⁵ Human Rights Watch 'World Report 2009': "Ethiopian bombardments regularly fall on civilian homes and public spaces, sometimes killing entire families" <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/somalia>; Human Rights Watch 'World Report 2010': "all parties are implicated in war crimes or other serious human rights abuses." <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/somalia>; Human Rights Watch 'World Report 2011': "Throughout 2010, with all parties conducting indiscriminate attacks causing high civilian casualties." <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011/country-chapters/somalia>; Human Rights Watch 'World Report 2012': "Indiscriminate attacks were committed by all parties to the conflict during a series of military offensives led by the TFG, with the support of AMISOM and ASWJ, in late 2010 and between February and May 2011." <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/somalia>; Human Rights Watch 'World Report 2013': "the forces arrayed against it – a combination of Somali government security forces, troops with the AMISOM, Ethiopian government forces, and allied militias – committed abuses, including indiscriminate attacks harming civilians and arbitrary arrests and detentions." <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/somalia>; Human Rights Watch 'World Report 2014': "African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopian government troops, and allied militias – have also committed abuses." <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/somalia>; Human Rights Watch 'World Report 2015': "Somali government security forces, African Union (AU) troops, and allied militias were responsible for indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, and arbitrary arrests and detention." <https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2015/country-chapters/somalia>; and so on.

¹⁶ See OECD DAC, 'CONVERGED STATISTICAL REPORTING DIRECTIVES FOR THE CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM (CRS) AND THE ANNUAL DAC QUESTIONNAIRE', 8 Apr 2016, [www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DCDDAC\(2016\)3FINAL.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DCDDAC(2016)3FINAL.pdf), p 28-29.

¹⁷ See for example Saferworld, 'We need to talk about Egypt', (Saferworld, October 2017), <https://saferworld-indepth.squarespace.com/we-need-to-talk-about-egypt>; Nyagah T, Mwangi J, Attree L, 'Inside Kenya's war on terror: the case of Lamu' (Saferworld, 2017), <https://saferworld-indepth.squarespace.com/s/inside-v5-kenyas-war-on-terror-pdf-v5-7eph.pdf>; Aliaga L, Tricot O'Farrell K, 'Counter-terror in Tunisia: a road paved with good intentions?' (Saferworld, 2017).

¹⁸ Civicus, 'New Report: 6 in 10 countries now seriously repressing civic freedoms', 27 November 2018, <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/reports-publications>.

¹⁹ Antonio Guterres, "Counter-terrorism and human rights: winning the fight while upholding our values" (speech, SOAS, University of London, London, 16 November 2017), United Nations Secretary General, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-11-16/secretary-general-s-speech-soas-university-london-counter-terrorism>.

²⁰ For example, The EU was taken to task by the European Court of Auditors for the 'limited results' of its S&J assistance to DRC, citing 'The absence of political will, the donor-driven dynamics of the programmes and the lack of absorption capacity'. European Court Of Auditors, 'EU SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO', Special Report No 9, 2013, p.7.

²¹ Bryden M, 'Somalia Redux', (CSIS, August 2013), p 9.

²² See, for example, Chandler C, 'Inside the EU's flawed \$200 million migration deal with Sudan', (IRIN, 30 Jan 2018)

²³ Levitt M, 'Targeting terror: U.S Policy towards Middle Eastern State Sponsors and Terrorist Organizations, Post – September 11', (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), p 95; see also ICG 'Yemen: coping with terrorism and violence' (January 2003), p 24.

²⁴ Attree L (2016), 'Blown back – lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Yemen', (Saferworld, February), citing ICG (2013), 'Yemen's Military-Security Reform Seeds of New Conflict' (Brussels: ICG), p11, and Human Rights Watch (2013), "Between a drone and al-Qaeda" The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen', p 17.

²⁵ Human Rights Watch (2013), "Between a drone and al-Qaeda" The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen', p 17-18.

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